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I. INTRODUCTIOND URING this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court was par-
ticularly active in the area of professional liability, issuing opin-
ions on privity issues and damages in the legal malpractice
context and on several issues related to health care liability claims under
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. The high court
also addressed issues related to directors' and officers' liability insurance
coverage and the demand requirements for derivative claims. As in years
past, this Survey period was dominated by appellate decisions in favor of
professional defendants, although plaintiffs did have a few victories, in-
cluding a clarification regarding who can sue for legal malpractice on be-
half of a former client's estate and the circumstances under which a legal
malpractice plaintiff can recover a portion of his attorneys' fees incurred
in the underlying representation.
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONTINUES To GRAPPLE WITH
PRIVITY ISSUES
The Texas Supreme Court continued to refine the contours of the priv-
ity barrier to legal malpractice claims by non-clients. As we reported in
past Surveys, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in 2006 that personal repre-
sentatives of a deceased client's estate have standing to bring legal mal-
practice claims on behalf of the estate, reversing two court of appeals
opinions that had held to the contrary.'
During this Survey period, the supreme court revisited one of those
cases in Smith v. O'Donnell.2 Thomas O'Donnell, as executor of the es-
tate of Corwin D. Denney, appealed from a summary judgment in favor
of the law firm and attorneys who provided legal advice to Denney dur-
ing his lifetime in his capacity as executor of his wife's estate.3 The San
1. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex.
2006); O'Donnell v. Smith, 197 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. 2006) (vacating judgment of the court of
appeals and remanding for reconsideration in light of the supreme court's decision in Belt).
2. 288 S.W.3d at 420-21.
3. O'Donnell v. Smith, 234 S.W.3d 135, 138 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007), aff'd,
288 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2009).
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Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, but that decision
was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Belt. On recon-
sideration, the defendant attorneys argued that the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment, even in light of Belt, because Belt only "nar-
rowly relaxed the privity barrier to allow suits by personal representatives
for estate-planning malpractice."4 The attorneys maintained that, because
the claims against them arose out of advice to Denney with regard to his
wife's estate and not his own, it was not an "estate planning" malpractice
case and, therefore, was not governed by Belt.5 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, however, and held that, in concluding that the legal malpractice
claims in Belt survived the death of the client, the supreme court relied on
general legal principles and did not limit its holding to the estate-planning
context. 6 In an opinion issued in June 2009, the supreme court agreed
with the court of appeals and held that Belt was not limited strictly to
estate-planning cases but rather applied whenever the executor, standing
in the shoes of the deceased, could bring a malpractice claim on behalf of
the deceased client.7
B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT RULES ON Two OF THREE NOVEL
DAMAGES QUESTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court avoided a malpractice damages issue of
great interest to Texas lawyers, but did bring clarity to two other damages
issues-proof of collectability in the underlying case and recovery of at-
torneys' fees spent in correcting or mitigating an attorney's mistake. In
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. National Development and
Research Corp.,8 the plaintiff National Development and Research
(NDR) sued its former counsel alleging legal malpractice in connection
with a lawsuit between NDR and Panda Energy International (Panda In-
ternational) and two of its subsidiaries, Panda Global Energy Co. (Panda
Global) and Pan-Sino Energy Development Co., LLC (Pan-Sino). The
underlying lawsuit was tried to a jury in August 1999, and the trial court
entered judgment generally in favor of the Panda entities.9 After the
judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, NDR sued its trial coun-
sel, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (Akin Gump), alleging that Akin
Gump negligently failed to request jury instructions asking whether
Panda breached a Letter and Shareholders' Agreement between them.
In the malpractice action, the jury found that Akin Gump's negligence
in connection with the Panda litigation had resulted in the following dam-
ages: (1) the judgment paid by NDR in the underlying lawsuit; (2) the
amount of money NDR likely would have recovered from Panda in the
underlying litigation; and (3) a portion of the attorneys' fees incurred by
4. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 142 n.9.
6. Id. at 142.
7. Smith, 288 S.W.3d at 422-23.
8. 299 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tex. 2009).
9. Id. at 110.
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NDR in the Panda litigation.10 Akin Gump did not appeal the finding of
negligence or the first element of damages but appealed the other dam-
age awards.
One of the issues considered by the supreme court was the proof re-
quired to show that a favorable judgment in an underlying case could
have been collected. In order to prevail on a malpractice claim arising
out of underlying litigation, the client must prove the amount of damages
that would have been recoverable and collectible if the other case had
been properly prosecuted." In the present case, the jury was instructed
to consider "the amount of money NDR actually would have recovered
and collected from [Panda Global and Panda International]."1 2 On ap-
peal, Akin Gump argued that the court of appeals erred in considering
evidence of collectability at the time the Panda litigation was filed and
that there was legally insufficient evidence that the judgment would have
been collected. The supreme court agreed and held that a malpractice
plaintiff must produce evidence that a judgment would have been collect-
ible at the time the plaintiff could have initiated collection efforts.13 Ac-
cordingly, evidence of the solvency of the defendant at any time prior to
when the underlying judgment could have been collected is relevant only
if it is coupled with evidence that the defendant's financial condition did
not change during the time before a judgment was signed.14 Because
NDR had not presented legally sufficient evidence to prove the col-
lectability of the damages it would have been awarded from Panda, those
damages awards were reversed.
Akin Gump also argued that the damages based on the alleged judg-
ment against Panda should have been reduced by the contingency fee
NDR would have owed had it prevailed in the underlying litigation. Akin
Gump argued that, had NDR prevailed in the underlying trial, it would
have owed Akin Gump a ten-percent contingency fee and, therefore, the
verdict should be reduced by that amount in order to place NDR in the
same position it would have occupied absent the alleged negligence.' 5
There is a split in authority on this issue in other jurisdictions, but be-
cause the supreme court held that NDR did not prove that any damage
award would have been collectible, it did not have to decide whether any
such award should be reduced to take into account the contingency fee.16
NDR prevailed on one aspect of its damages claim, however. The
court of appeals held that the attorneys' fees NDR paid in the Panda
litigation were not recoverable as damages in the malpractice litigation.' 7
10. Id. at Ill.
11. Id. at 112 (citing Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1989)).
12. Id. (alteration in original).
13. Id. at 114.
14. Id.
15. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP v. Nat'l Dev. & Research Corp., 232
S.W.3d 883, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007), rev'd, 299 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. 2009).
16. Akin Gump, 299 S.W.3d at 118-19.
17. Id. at 119.
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The supreme court disagreed. It recognized the "American Rule" that
attorneys' fees generally are not recoverable absent a statute or contract
that allows for their recovery, but went on to conclude that a malpractice
plaintiff may recover damages for attorneys' fees paid in the underlying
case "to the extent the fees were proximately caused by the defendant
attorney's negligence." An example of this is when the client has to incur
attorneys' fees to correct the attorney's alleged mistake.18
C. CAUSATION REQUIREMENT IN DTPA AcTION
In Hackett v. Littlepage & Booth,19 the Austin Court of Appeals at-
tempted to clear up the confusion caused by the 1998 Texas Supreme
Court case, Latham v. Castillo.20 In Latham, the supreme court held that
a plaintiff suing an attorney under the DTPA does not have to prove the
"suit-within-a-suit" element usually necessary for a legal malpractice
claim.21 However, the statute does require that the alleged unconsciona-
ble act be the "producing cause of actual damages." 22 In Latham, for
example, the plaintiff presented evidence of mental-anguish damages
arising from the attorney's conduct. Plaintiffs have attempted to use this
language from Latham to maintain a DTPA claim where a legal malprac-
tice claim would fail for lack of causation because the plaintiff could not
prove the underlying suit-within-a-suit. The plaintiff in Hackett, for ex-
ample, based his DTPA damages on the allegation that, but for the al-
leged negligence of the defendant attorneys, he would have had a
"viable" medical malpractice case against his treating physicians. Under
this type of damages theory, the Austin Court of Appeals confirmed that
proof of the suit-within-a-suit was required even under the DTPA be-
cause "[w]ithout admissible testimony that raises a fact issue that [plain-
tiff's] medical malpractice case was 'viable,' there was no evidence that,
'but for' his lawyers' alleged conduct, [plaintiff] would not have sustained
injury." 23
D. PERSONAL AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN TEXAS STATE
COURTS
As in past years, Texas courts dealt with questions of personal jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state lawyers during this Survey period.24 For example,
the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals found that Texas did not have
personal jurisdiction over the New York law firm of Proskauer Rose,
18. Id. at 120-22.
19. No. 03-08-00056-CV, 2009 WL 416620, at *7-9 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 20, 2009,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
20. 972 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1998).
21. Id. at 69.
22. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §17.50(a) (Vernon 2009)).
23. Hackett, 2009 WL 416620, at *10.
24. See Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Sarah Hodges, Professional Liabil-
ity, 61 SMU L. REV. 1047 (2008); Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Elizabeth A.
Snyder, Professional Liability, 60 SMU L. REV. 1233 (2007).
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LLP. The plaintiffs in Proskauer Rose, LLP v. Pelican Trading, Inc.2 5
brought claims against the defendant law firm arising out of advice Pros-
kauer Rose provided regarding certain tax shelters created with the assis-
tance of Ernst & Young, LLP. 2 6 The law firm filed a special appearance
denying any personal jurisdiction in Texas. In reversing the trial court's
denial of the special appearance, the court of appeals held that perform-
ing legal services in New York, such as drafting opinion letters and a
"Certificate of Facts," would not constitute purposeful availment, even if
the work product were transmitted to a Texas client.27 The court of ap-
peals reiterated its prior holding in Markette v. X-Ray X-Press Corp.28
that "neither the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship be-
tween a resident client and an out-of-state attorney nor the routine corre-
spondence and interactions attendant to that relationship are enough to
confer personal jurisdiction." 29
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals also declined to exercise jurisdiction
over a Florida law firm in Gordon & Doner, P.A. v. Joros.30 The court of
appeals held that entering into a joint-representation agreement with a
Texas firm to represent a Florida client in litigation in New York did not
constitute "purposeful availment" so as to subject the Florida law firm to
jurisdiction in Texas.31 Although entering into a contract with a Texas
resident does satisfy the Texas long-arm statute, a Texas court still cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless the defendant
meets the minimum-contacts requirement of federal due process. 32 Be-
cause the Florida defendant's contacts with Texas were limited to enter-
ing into the joint-representation agreement whereby the Texas law firm
would provide legal services in Texas, the court of appeals found that it
had no general or specific jurisdiction over the Florida defendant. 33
Texas state courts' reluctance to impose personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state attorneys should be compared with the Fifth Circuit's recent rul-
ing in Walk Haydel & Associates, Inc. v. Coastal Power Production Co.,34
in which it reversed the lower court's ruling that it did not have personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state law firm defendant. The Fifth Circuit
held that the plaintiff, Delasa, had met its burden to establish a prima
facie case for specific jurisdiction in Louisiana. Plaintiff produced evi-
dence at the hearing that the defendant law firm had agreed to represent
a Louisiana client, Delasa, that it had assisted in setting up a meeting in
New Orleans involving Delasa, and that in the course of repeated tele-
25. No. 14-08-00283, 2009 WL 242993 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2009,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
26. Id. at *1 (Ernst & Young was sued as well but was not a party to the appeal.).
27. Id. at *4.
28. 240 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
29. Proskauer Rose, 2009 WL 242993, at *4.
30. 287 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
31. Id. at 333.
32. Id. at 332 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 2008)).
33. Id. at 335-36.
34. 517 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2008).
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phone calls and correspondence with Delasa in Louisiana, the law firm
had failed to disclose that it had an alleged conflict of interest.35 Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient to make a
prima facie case of "the purposeful direction of material omissions to
[Louisiana]." 3 6 The Fifth Circuit also noted that it could consider, as
"part of the analysis," that the harmful effects of the law firm's allegedly
wrongful actions were felt in Louisiana.37
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered the issue of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in Minton v. Gunn.38 Minton was a legal malpractice case
based on alleged negligence during the litigation of a patent infringement
case in federal court. The plaintiff alleged that, in the underlying patent
infringement case, the defendant lawyers failed to timely plead and pur-
sue the "experimental use doctrine" and that, as a result, the plaintiff's
patent infringement case was dismissed on summary judgment, depriving
the plaintiff of a potential judgment against the patent defendants or, in
the alternative, a $100,000,000 settlement.39 In the subsequent malprac-
tice action, the plaintiff bore the burden of establishing that, but for the
attorneys' alleged negligence, the plaintiff would have prevailed in the
underlying litigation. The defendants filed a motion for summary judg-
ment alleging that, as a matter of law, the experimental use doctrine was
not applicable, and therefore, their failure to plead and pursue it did not
result in any harm to plaintiff.
As an initial matter, the court of appeals considered whether it had
jurisdiction to consider this malpractice action. Minton alleged that his
case "'arises under' the exclusive patent law jurisdiction of the federal
courts." 4 0 In making his argument, Minton relied on two Federal Circuit
cases, Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld, LLP and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP,41 both
of which hold that
when a state legal malpractice claim requires the hypothetical adjudi-
cation of the merits of an underlying federal patent infringement
lawsuit-that is, trial of the patent infringement suit within the legal
malpractice suit-the legal malpractice case presents a disputed, sub-
stantial question of federal patent law conferring Section 1338 juris-
35. Id. at 244-45.
36. Id. at 245 (alteration in original).
37. Id.
38. 301 S.W.3d 702, 706-10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. filed).
39. The defendants in the underlying patent infringement suit relied on the "on sale
bar rule" as a defense to the plaintiff's infringement claims and won summary judgment
based on that doctrine. After the summary judgment ruling, the plaintiff sought to raise
the "experimental use doctrine" as a way to avoid application of the "on sale bar rule," but
the court did not allow the plaintiff to raise experimental use at that point in the litigation.
Id. at 706.
40. Id. at 708.
41. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504




diction on the federal courts.42
Surprisingly, however, the court of appeals declined to follow these two
cases and held that it did have jurisdiction over this malpractice case.43
The court of appeals went on to hold that the experimental use doctrine
was not applicable to the underlying patent infringement case and, there-
fore, summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys was
appropriate. 44
E. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT
In Chambers v. O'Quinn,45 the Houston First Court of Appeals joined
a growing number of Texas courts in upholding mandatory arbitration
agreements in legal malpractice cases. Arbitration agreements are gener-
ally favored under both federal and state law, but section 171.002(a)(3) of
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that arbitration
agreements in "personal injury" cases be signed by each party and each
party's independent attorney.46 Siding with the majority of Texas courts,
the Chambers court held that a legal malpractice case is not a claim for
"personal injury" even if the underlying case involved personal injury
claims.47
The Chambers court also refused to adopt the plaintiffs' argument that
mandatory arbitration provisions between attorneys and clients violate
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.08(g) pro-
vides that an attorney may not "[enter] into an agreement with a client
that prospectively limits the attorney's liability to the client" except under
certain circumstances. 48 The court of appeals agreed with prior Texas ap-
pellate courts in holding that a mandatory arbitration provision does not
limit the attorney's liability, but "merely prescribes the procedure for
resolving any disputes between attorney and client"; therefore, such an
agreement does not violate the disciplinary rules. 49
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals ruled similarly in Labidi v.
Sydow,50 holding that legal malpractice claims are not personal injury
claims under the meaning of section 171.002 of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code and that arbitration agreements between lawyers and cli-
42. Minton, 301 S.W.3d at 718 (Walker, J., dissenting) (citing Air Measurement Techs.,
504 F.3d at 1272-73, and Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1283).
43. Id. at 709.
44. Id. at 714-15.
45. 305 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).
46. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(a)(3) (Vernon 2005).
47. Id. at *3-4 (comparing Taylor v. Wilson, 180 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Miller v. Brewer, 118 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2003, no pet.); In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet.
denied), with In re Godt, 28 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.)).
48. Chambers, 305 S.W.3d at 150-51 (discussing TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P.
1.08(g),reprinted in TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G (Vernon 2005)); see also Keck,
Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d 692, 699 (Tex. 2000).
49. Chambers, 305 S.W.3d at 151 (citing In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d at 689).
50. 287 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
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ents do not violate Texas public policy. The court of appeals also dis-
cussed the recent opinion issued by the Texas Ethics Commission, which
states that an attorney must make the client aware of the significant ad-
vantages and disadvantages of arbitration and provide sufficient informa-
tion to permit the client to make an informed decision about whether to
agree to the arbitration provision.51 The court of appeals noted that
opinions of the Texas Ethics Commission are advisory rather than bind-
ing and that, in any event, such opinions govern the conduct of lawyers
but do not affect the enforceability of arbitration provisions.52
Accordingly, the majority of Texas courts seem to be enforcing
mandatory arbitration agreements in legal malpractice cases. However,
to avoid a potential ethical violation, attorneys desiring to take advantage
of mandatory arbitration should be careful to ensure that the provisions
are not unduly burdensome on the client and that the client receives full
disclosure before signing the agreement.
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. APPLICABILITY OF CHAPTER 74
As anyone who deals with medical malpractice claims in Texas should
know, "health care liability claims" are subject to the provisions and re-
quirements of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74. "A
health care liability claim" is defined as:
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treat-
ment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or
administrative services directly related to health care, which proxi-
mately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claim-
ant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.53
During the Survey period, several courts dealt with the issue of whether a
claim was a "health care liability claim" and, thus, subject to Chapter 74.
The most notable case on this topic was a Texas Supreme Court deci-
sion, Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital.54 The plaintiff in Marks was
recovering from back surgery at the defendant hospital. He attempted to
stand up by pushing off the hospital bed's footboard, but the footboard
came loose, causing Marks to fall. Marks alleged that the hospital was
negligent for various reasons,
including (1) failing to train and supervise the nursing staff properly,
(2) failing to provide him with the assistance he required for daily
living activities, (3) failing to provide him with a safe environment in
51. Id. (citing Op. TEX. ETmics COMM'N No. 586 (2008)).
52. Id.
53. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
54. No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2009). This case was decided under
Chapter 74's predecessor statute, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4590i, but, as the supreme
court noted, the pertinent language from that statute is similar to that in the current Chap-
ter 74. See id. at *24 n.2.
2010] 737
SMU LAW REVIEW
which to recover, and (4) providing a hospital bed that had been neg-
ligently assembled and maintained by the hospital's employees.55
Marks did not serve an expert medical report within 120 days after filing
his petition, as required by Chapter 74, and the hospital filed a motion to
dismiss on that basis. The trial court dismissed all of the claims, holding
that they were all health care liability claims for which an expert report
was required. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all of the
claims based on the same reasoning. 56
In a 5-4 decision, the supreme court agreed that the first three claims
were health care liability claims, but it held that the fourth was not. The
supreme court applied three factors to determine whether the claim was a
health care liability claim: "(1) whether the specialized knowledge of a
medical expert may be necessary to prove the claim, (2) whether a spe-
cialized standard in the health care community applies to the alleged cir-
cumstances, and (3) whether the negligent act involves medical judgment
related to the patient's care or treatment."57 First, Marks presented evi-
dence that the footboard was the responsibility of the maintenance staff,
and the evaluation of maintenance staff duties would not require expert
testimony. Second, the breaking of a footboard did not invoke a special
standard of care unique to the medical community. Third, while there are
circumstances in which medical judgment might be involved in hospital
bed assembly or use, this was not one of those cases. The supreme court
also relied on the statute's policy: to remedy a "medical malpractice in-
surance crisis" in Texas.58 The claim in this case would not be covered by
medical malpractice insurance. Rather, it would be covered by the hospi-
tal's general commercial liability insurance since, "[a]t its core, Marks's
hospital bed claim involves the failure of a piece of equipment." 59 The
supreme court also noted, "it is not the identities of the parties or the
place of injury that defines the claim." 60
Various courts of appeals also struggled with the issue of what consti-
tutes a "health care liability claim." The Beaumont Court of Appeals
held that the failure of a nursing home to provide food and water was a
health care liability claim in Medical Hospital of Buna Texas, Inc. v.
Wheatley.61 In that case, the plaintiff sued a nursing home for failure to
adequately take care of a resident but did not serve expert reports. The
nursing home moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the motion,
holding that the claims were not health care liability claims. On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that her original and first amended petitions alleged
55. Id. at *1.
56. The case was appealed once to the Texas Supreme Court, but after the decision in
Diversicare, the case was remanded to the court of appeals for further determinations. See
St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Marks, 193 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). The appeal
of those determinations is what is addressed here.
57. Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *4.
58. Id. at *3.
59. Id. at *5.
60. Id. at *8.
61. 287 S.W.3d 286, 289-90 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, pet. filed).
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health care liability claims only in the alternative, and that the second
amended petition omitted the health care liability claims altogether. The
original petition stated that the nursing home "failed to properly attend
to the needs of the residents of the nursing home," while the second
amended petition claimed that the nursing home failed to provide "basic
human necessities." 6 2 The court of appeals found no difference between
the two assertions and held that "supervision and providing for the funda-
mental care needs of [the plaintiff] are inseparable from health care ser-
vices provided to [the plaintiff] as a resident of the nursing home." 63
Further, it added that a claim alleging that a nursing home failed to ade-
quately provide food and water to the plaintiff was a claim of substandard
care of a heath care provider. Therefore, the claims were subject to
Chapter 74 and should have been dismissed for failure to serve a timely
expert report.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals determined that claims concern-
ing problems with a laser hair removal were not health care liability
claims in Tesoro v. Alvarez.64 The court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's
theory that because the sessions involved "treatment" they inherently in-
volved health care, reasoning that this treatment was not related to health
care, as the statute requires. In Turtle Healthcare Group, LLC v. Linan,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided that allegations that a
healthcare group provided an uncharged battery for a ventilator machine
was not a health care liability claim subject to Chapter 74.65 In that case,
the plaintiff requested an oxygen tank and two batteries for a ventilator
machine from the health care group. The employee delivered them, but
the battery put into the machine "turned out to be uncharged." 66 Noting
that the claim would not require expert testimony to prove, the court of
appeals held that the claim was not a health care liability claim within the
meaning of the statute.67
B. MANDAMUS REVIEW AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS IN
CHALLENGES TO EXPERT REPORTS
The question of how and when to appeal the denial of a motion to
dismiss has been the subject of many recent Texas cases. Adding to the
confusion in this area is the statute's differing treatment of "deficient"
reports as opposed to late-filed or absent reports. Under Chapter 74, a
plaintiff who files a health care liability claim is required to serve an ex-
pert report within 120 days of filing the original petition.68 The expert
report must provide a fair summary of the expert's opinions regarding the
62. Id. at 289-91.
63. Id. at 294.
64. 281 S.W.3d 654, 655-56 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.).
65. No. 13-08-00533-CV, 2009 WL 1905379, at *7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 11,
2009, pet. filed).
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id. at *7.
68. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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standard of care, how the defendant allegedly breached that standard,
and a causal relationship between the breach and the plaintiff's injury.69
If the plaintiff fails to timely serve the expert report, the trial court shall
dismiss the claims with prejudice.70 On the other hand, if the plaintiff
serves a report that is deficient in some way, the trial court may grant one
thirty-day extension to cure the defects.7' An interlocutory appeal may
be taken from a denial of a motion to dismiss based on failure to serve a
report, but an interlocutory appeal is statutorily prohibited from an order
granting a thirty-day extension. 72 Since these statutory changes were en-
acted in 2003 and 2005, courts have wrestled with the minutiae, and many
issues have reached the Texas Supreme Court. For instance, in Badiga v.
Lopez,73 a case within this Survey period but' discussed in the last Sur-
vey,74 the supreme court held that a defendant may seek an interlocutory
appeal of a trial court order that simultaneously granted a thirty-day ex-
tension and denied a motion to dismiss if the report were not timely filed.
A few days after deciding Badiga, the Texas Supreme Court issued In
re Watkins75 on a similar issue. The plaintiff in that case filed a "report"
that the defendant claimed was merely a "narrative of treatment."7 6 The
report was missing opinions as to the applicable standard of care, breach,
and causation. The trial court granted a thirty-day extension for the
plaintiff to cure the defects. Dr. Watkins, a defendant, filed a joint inter-
locutory appeal and petition for writ of mandamus to the court of ap-
peals. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction
since this was an appeal of an extension to cure a deficient expert re-
port.77 The court of appeals also denied mandamus relief.78 Dr. Watkins
did not appeal the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal, but instead pur-
sued only the mandamus claim in the supreme court.
Dr. Watkins argued to the supreme court that since the report was
missing a standard of care, breach, and causation, it was not an "expert
report" as contemplated by the legislature. But the supreme court did
not reach that issue. Instead, in a short majority opinion, the supreme
court determined that mandamus relief was not the appropriate remedy.
The supreme court reasoned that if no report had been served at all,
there was an adequate remedy through interlocutory appeal, so manda-
mus relief was not available.79 Moreover, if a deficient report had been
served, mandamus relief was also not appropriate. The supreme court
69. Id. § 74.351(r)(6).
70. Id. § 74.351(b)(2).
71. Id. § 74.351(c).
72. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon 2008).
73. 274 S.W.3d 681, 682-85 (Tex. 2009).
74. See Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Jennifer C. Wang, Professional Lia-
bility, 62 SMU L. REV. 1392 (2009).
75. 279 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. 2009).
76. Id. at 633.
77. Id. at 634.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon 2008).
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reasoned that the legislature meant to limit review of deficient reports by
expressly disallowing interlocutory appeals. Therefore, allowing manda-
mus review would subvert legislative intent. The supreme court accord-
ingly denied the petition for mandamus.
If Dr. Watkins had pursued the interlocutory appeal rather than the
mandamus, the supreme court may have reached Dr. Watkins's argument
that the report was so deficient that it constituted no report at all. That
issue was highlighted by Justice Willett in Ogletree v. Matthews,80 a Texas
Supreme Court opinion discussed in a previous survey. At that time, it
was assumed that the issue was a "rare bird."8' But in the past three
years, three separate supreme court decisions and several appellate court
decisions have touched on-but not answered-the issue.82
Justices Johnson and Willett wrote separately in Watkins to explain that
they each believed the expert report, merely a "status report," to be
wholly deficient such that it was "not a statutory expert report at all."83
Justice Willett lamented that Dr. Watkins did not pursue the interlocutory
appeal so that the supreme court could address this question once and for
all. Willett stated he would not allow an extension in a case where the
expert report "bears zero resemblance to the statute" and is "no more an
expert report than my son's tricycle is a Harley." 84
Although the issue of what constitutes an adequate expert report re-
mains unanswered by the Texas Supreme Court, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals did address it during the Survey period. In Scoresby v. Santil-
lan,85 the court determined the plaintiff's expert report was deficient but
not so deficient that it was no report at all. In that case, the plaintiff
served an expert report before the 120-day deadline but failed to timely
serve a curriculum vitae as required by statute. 86 The trial court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss based on failure to serve a complying
medical report, and the court granted a thirty-day extension to "cure any
deficiencies" in the expert report.87 The doctor defendant appealed, ar-
guing that the plaintiff's expert report was so lacking as to constitute no
report at all. The court of appeals interpreted Ogletree to mean that
there are only two classes of reports: (1) those that are deficient and (2)
80. 262 S.W.3d 316, 317 (Tex. 2007) (Willett, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 324 (Willett, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 316-17; In re Watkins, 279 S.W.3d 33, 633-34 (Tex. 2009); Lewis v. Fun-
derburk, 253 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2008); Bogar v. Esparza, 257 S.W.3d 354, 357-58 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (purported report was no report at all); Rivenes v. Holden,
257 S.W.3d 332, 338-39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (same);
Apodaca v. Russo, 228 S.W.3d 252, 255-58 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.) (same); Tenet
Hosp., Ltd. v. Gomez, 276 S.W.3d 9, 12-13 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.) (report was
not so deficient as to constitute no report at all); Cook v. Spears, 275 S.W.3d 577, 580-82
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (same).
83. Watkins, 279 S.W.3d at 635 (Johnson, J., concurring); see also id. at 636 (Willett, J.,
concurring).
84. Id. at 636-39 (Willett, J., concurring).
85. 287 S.W.3d 319, 323-25 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. filed).
86. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
87. Scoresby, 287 S.W.3d at 321.
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those that are not served at all.88 The court of appeals determined that
the plaintiff did serve a report in this case. Therefore, it necessarily fell
into the first category and was merely deficient-lacking the curriculum
vitae. The court of appeals added, "[No] supreme court opinion holds
that a timely served expert report containing a narrative that fails to in-
clude any expert opinion on the standard of care, breach, or causation is
tantamount to no report at all and thus ineligible for any [thirty-day] ex-
tension." 89 The court of appeals reasoned that the legislature's provided
remedy for a faulty report was time to fix it and not dismissal of the claim
entirely. Furthermore, the court of appeals added, an appeal from such
an extension, even if it was coupled with a denial of a motion to dismiss,
was not proper.90 Thus, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
C. DALLAS COURT OF APPEALS DEFINES BEGINNING OF 120-DAY
PERIOD
In Lone Star HMA v. Wheeler,91 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
Chapter 74 means what it says and that the 120-day period for filing an
expert report begins on "the date the original petition was filed" even if
an amended petition later adds additional or different defendants. 92 The
plaintiffs in that case filed their original petition on January 17, 2008, but
the petition incorrectly identified the hospital defendant. At the same
time, the plaintiffs also filed an expert report that did not reference the
claims against the hospital. In their first amended petition, plaintiffs at-
tempted to correct the name of the hospital, but it was not until the sec-
ond amended petition, filed March 31, 2008, that the hospital entity was
named correctly and served. On July 11, 2008, 176 days after the original
petition was filed, but only 101 days after the second amended petition,
the plaintiffs served an expert report addressing the claims against the
hospital. The trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to serve an expert report within 120 days of the petition. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the plain language of the statute required
service of a complying medical report "not later than the 120th day after
the date the original petition was filed." 93 Contrary to the plaintiffs' ar-
guments, there was no statutory exception that allowed counting from the
date of an amended petition adding a new defendant, nor was there an
exception that provided a grace period in cases of alleged
misidentification. 94
88. Id. at 324 (citing Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. 2007)).
89. Id. at 324-25.
90. Id. (citing Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 321).
91. 292 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
92. Id. at 815-16.
93. Id. at 815 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2009)) (emphasis in opinion).
94. Id. at 816-17. The hospital had argued that it was sued, although incorrectly
named, in the original petition. Plaintiffs countered that the hospital was not sued until the
name was corrected in the second amended petition. The court of appeals did not decide
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D. EXPERT REPORTS ADDRESSING VICARIOUSLY LIABLE
DEFENDANTS
Often medical negligence plaintiffs sue both physicians and another en-
tity such as a hospital or a physician's group, but serve one expert report
that addresses the alleged negligence of only the physician. In these situ-
ations, the entity defendant may argue the claims against it should be
dismissed since the expert report did not address any claims against it.
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court discussed this issue
in Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc.95 In that case, a plaintiff underwent a
lumbar epidural procedure that allegedly caused spinal meningitis, result-
ing in the plaintiff's hearing loss. The plaintiff sued both the operating
doctor and the corporation that owned and operated the facility where
the procedure was performed. The plaintiff timely served an expert re-
port, but the report did not mention or address any negligence by the
corporation. The corporation moved to dismiss. The plaintiff argued that
all the claims against the corporation were vicarious and, therefore, the
expert report did not need to specifically implicate the corporation. The
supreme court agreed and held, "[w]hen a party's alleged health care lia-
bility is purely vicarious, a report that adequately implicates the actions
of that party's agents or employees is sufficient." 96
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals extended the holding of
Gardner to professional associations in Obstetrical and Gynecological As-
sociates, P.A. v. McCoy. 9 7 There, the plaintiff's expert report implicated
the actions of only the doctor and not the doctor's professional associa-
tion. The court of appeals determined that the claims alleged against the
professional association were vicarious in nature and, applying the same
reasoning as Gardner, held it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to pro-
vide a separate expert report for the professional association.9 8
On the other hand, when there are direct claims against the entity
based on the entity's own alleged negligence, the expert report must spe-
cifically address those claims, even if the plaintiff alleges both vicarious
liability and direct liability claims against the entity. The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals faced this issue in In re Knapp Medical Center Hospi-
tal.99 The plaintiffs in that case raised both direct and vicarious claims
against the entity, and the court of appeals determined that the plaintiffs
should produce reports addressing both the doctor and the entity in such
a situation. 00 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reached the same con-
this issue, holding instead that the time period began to run on the day the original petition
was filed, regardless of whether the hospital was named correctly or added later. Id. at 817.
95. 274 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
96. Id. at 671-72.
97. 283 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
98. Id. at 106-08.
99. No. 13-09-00381-CV, 2009 WL 2398003 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, orig.
proceeding).
100. Id. at *34.
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clusion in Vestal v. Wright.'01
E. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-PARTY MEDICAL
PROVIDERS
Chapter 74 also requires that, at least sixty days before filing a health
care liability claim, the plaintiff must serve a notice of the claim to each
physician or health care provider against whom the claim will be made.102
Furthermore, the notice must be served with a statutory medical authori-
zation form, allowing the soon-to-be defendants to obtain the claimant's
medical records.103 Some defense attorneys, upon notice of the claim,
attempt to gather information from non-party physicians through ex
parte communications with them. They can then obtain information that
is not contained in either the plaintiff's claims or medical records. The
Texas Supreme Court recently held in In re Collins'0" that this was per-
missible because such communications were included in the statutory
release.
In Collins, the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discre-
tion when it issued a protective order preventing defendants and their
attorneys from ex parte contacts with plaintiff's non-party medical prov-
iders. That case involved claims by the patient, Kelly Regian, against her
physician, Dr. Lester Collins. Before filing the lawsuit, in compliance
with Chapter 74, the Regians sent Dr. Collins notice of the health care
liability claim along with the statutorily required form release of pro-
tected health information.105 Soon after the Regians filed their petition,
they sought a protective order that would prohibit the defendants from
engaging in ex parte communications with Kelly Regian's treating physi-
cians. The plaintiffs were attempting to prevent defendants from ob-
taining information "with a wink and a smile" that went beyond the
plaintiff's medical records. 106 The trial court agreed and issued the pro-
tective order. Dr. Collins petitioned for mandamus relief. The Tyler
Court of Appeals denied the relief, holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.107
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. It acknowledged the unique pri-
vacy concerns of health care liability claims. However, it held that the
statutory release authorized "non-party health care providers to orally
convey relevant information to defendants."1 08 The supreme court noted
that the legislature provided a mechanism for a plaintiff to exclude medi-
cal records in the statutory release. Plaintiffs could then be the "gate-
101. No. 2-08-237-CV, 2009 WL 2751020, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2009,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
102. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (Vernon 2005).
103. Id. §§ 74.051(a), 74.052.
104. 286 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. 2009).
105. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a).
106. In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d at 914.
107. Id. at 915.
108. Id. at 918.
[Vol. 63744
Professional Liability
keepers of their own privileged health information." 109 Further, plaintiffs
are in the best position to identify in the first instance the information
they deem privileged. In this case, the Regians did not limit their release
but instead sought a protective order from the court. The supreme court
held this was an improper use of a protective order.110
The Regians also contended that the statutory release did not comply
with the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) since it was mandated and not voluntary. Therefore, the plain-
tiffs argued, HIPAA barred the ex parte communications.11 1 The su-
preme court disagreed, noting that the plaintiffs voluntarily filed the
lawsuit. Furthermore, the supreme court noted that HIPAA would pre-
empt state law only if it would be impossible for an entity to comply with
both the federal and the state laws. Since state law authorized disclosure
to the same extent that the federal law did, it was possible for an entity to
comply with both laws, and HIPAA did not preempt the Chapter 74
release. 112
IV. LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS
A. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EQUITABLE AND
CONTRACTUAL SUBROGATION
In cases of architectural and engineering malpractice, it is often the
case that the project-gone-wrong is insured by multiple parties, including
the professional's liability insurance and the owner's or client's casualty
insurance. Accordingly, in these types of cases, the doctrine of subroga-
tion may determine who is liable to pay for the damage and who can sue
the allegedly negligent professional. In Bay Rock Operating Co. v. St.
Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,113 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
discussed the difference between equitable and contractual subrogation
rights in the context of an engineering malpractice claim. In that case, a
well operator-Hollimon-hired Bay Rock Operating Company (Bay
Rock) to design, plan, and supervise the drilling of a well in Live Oak
County, Texas. During the drilling, there was a blowout at the surface,
which resulted in a fire at the rig. Hollimon filed a claim with its insur-
ance company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company (St. Paul),
which ultimately paid $2,857,778 in settlement of that claim. St. Paul, as
the subrogee to its insured, Holliman, then sued Bay Rock and obtained
a favorable jury verdict against it.
Bay Rock appealed the judgment against it arguing, among other
things, that although St. Paul had established its "right to bring a subroga-
tion action in the name of its insured, Hollimon," it had not established
other elements necessary to prove its "ability to recover on that subroga-
109. Id. at 919.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 920.
112. Id.
113. 298 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).
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tion right."1 4 Bay Rock argued that St. Paul had not presented sufficient
evidence that its settlement with Hollimon was for a "covered loss" or
that Hollimon had any right to recover from Bay Rock. 15 The court of
appeals began its analysis by discussing the differences between contrac-
tual subrogation and equitable subrogation. In cases of equitable subro-
gation, "a party must show it involuntarily paid a debt primarily owed by
another which in equity should have been paid by the other party."1" 6 In
contrast, the right to contractual subrogation is governed by the terms of
the agreement between the parties; therefore, the "policy declares the
parties' rights and obligations, which are not generally supplanted by
court-fashioned equitable rules that might apply, as a default gap-filler, in
the absence of a valid contract."11 7 The court of appeals found that the
additional requirements alleged by Bay Rock were derived from equita-
ble subrogation cases and did not apply to the instant case.118 Because
the court of appeals concluded that St. Paul had demonstrated its right to
subrogation under its contract with Hollimon, St. Paul stepped into the
shoes of its insured and obtained Hollimon's right to sue Bay Rock for
negligence.
B. CHAPTER 150 "CERTIFICATE OF MERIT" MUST BE BY A
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICING IN THE SAME AREA
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals examined a question of first im-
pression related to claims against architects in Landreth v. Las Brisas
Council of Co-Owners, Inc.119 The defendants in that case, an architect
and architectural firm, moved to dismiss the claims against them based on
the plaintiff's failure to file a certificate of merit satisfying the require-
ments of Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Sec-
tion 150.002 requires that in any action for damages arising out of the
provision of professional services by certain professionals, including li-
censed architects and engineers, the plaintiff must file a certificate of
merit by a professional with the same professional license, familiar with
the same area of practice as the defendant, which sets forth "at least one
negligent act, error, or omission."120
The defendants in Landreth argued that the plaintiff's certificate did
not comply with the statute because the defendants were engaged in "de-
sign restoration architecture," and the professional who submitted the af-
fidavit (1) did not affirmatively state in his initial affidavit that he
practiced in that area and (2) conceded in deposition that he had never
114. Id. at 222-23.
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id. (citing Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774
(Tex. 2007)).
117. Id. at 223-24 (quoting Fortix Benefits v. Cantu, 324 S.W.3d 642, 647-48 (Tex.
2007)).
118. Id. at 224.
119. 285 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.).




worked as a design restoration architect. 121 The plaintiff countered that
the statute did not require such a specific match between areas of practice
and also that, in supplemental affidavits, the expert had recited that he
practiced in the same area of practice as the defendant architect. The
court of appeals sided with the defendants, however, holding that the
plain language of the statute compels the court to look only at the initial
certificate filed, and not subsequent amendments. 122 Because the origi-
nal certificate did not state that the expert practiced in the same area of
practice as the defendant, the court should have granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss plaintiff's professional negligence claims.
The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiff, however, that only the
professional negligence claims should have been dismissed.123 The Lan-
dreth court agreed with the holding of the San Antonio Court of Appeals
in Gomez v. STFG, Inc.124 that the lack of a complying certificate of
merit requires the dismissal of negligence claims arising out of the "provi-
sion of professional services," but not any other claims. Accordingly, the
plaintiff's non-negligence claims, such as breach of agency, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and breach of contract, should not have been dismissed.125
The Austin Court of Appeals reached the same result in Consolidated
Reinforcement, LP v. Carothers Executive Homes, Ltd.,126 affirming the
trial court's refusal to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss claims for
breach of contract, breach of warranty, and deceptive trade practices.
The court of appeals could not determine whether the plaintiff's claim for
negligent misrepresentation "[arose] out of the provision of professional
services," and so remanded that claim for the trial court to reconsider
whether that claim should be dismissed pursuant to Chapter 150.127
V. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
A. COURTS CLARIFY THE RULES CONCERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
While wading through demand requirements in derivative actions, the
Texas Supreme Court commented on the difference between Jimmy Buf-
fett and Warren Buffett in In re Schmitz.128 In that case, the supreme
court explored and further clarified article 5.14 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act, which requires a shareholder to make a written demand
with particularity, regardless of whether such demand is futile, prior to
121. Id. at 497-98.
122. Id. at 499-500.
123. Id. at 500.
124. Id. (citing Gomez v. STFG, Inc., No. 04-07-00223-CV, 2007 WL 2846419 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Oct. 3, 2007, no pet.))
125. Id.
126. 271 S.W.3d 887, 894 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
127. Id. at 894-95. The Landreth case also included a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, but that opinion is not clear with regard to whether that claim was subject to dismis-
sal. See generally Landreth v. Las Brisas Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 492 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.).
128. 285 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. 2009).
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commencing a derivative proceeding. 129 Acknowledging that it had
never specified what constitutes an adequate demand, the supreme court
found that the Schmitz demand was inadequate because it did not iden-
tify a shareholder and because it was not made with sufficient
particularity. 13
The supreme court began its analysis with the history behind the de-
mand requirement in Texas, starting with the 1941 requirement in the
rules of civil procedure and ending with the revisions to the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act in 1997. The supreme court addressed the policy
behind the 1997 revisions, stating that they were made "to provide Texas
with modem and flexible business laws which should make Texas a more
attractive jurisdiction in which to incorporate."1 3 1 The supreme court
also noted that unlike during the prior century, Texas law now requires
that demand be made regardless of futility.13 2
Although the Schmitz plaintiffs provided a demand, albeit two
sentences, it did not identify the complaining shareholder.133 Holding
that demand cannot be made anonymously, the supreme court focused on
the language of article 5.14 for justification, noting that it "presumes that
a corporation knows the identity of the shareholder making the de-
mand." 134 First, article 5.14 contemplates that a corporation will notify or
advise a shareholder of a demand's rejection.s35 Consequently, the cor-
poration must know the identity of the shareholder. Second, the supreme
court, acknowledging the difference between a demand made by Warren
Buffett from a demand made by Jimmy Buffett, found that the identity of
the shareholder plays an important role in how the corporation responds
to a demand.136 For example, the identity of the complaining shareholder
affects the credibility of the demand itself. Third, the supreme court
noted that a corporation should not be expected "to incur the time and
expense involved in fully investigating a demand without verifying that it
comes from a valid source," that is, a shareholder who owns stock both at
the time of filing suit and continuously throughout the lawsuit.'3 7 Finally,
129. Id. at 455.
130. Id. at 455-58.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Specifically, the demand letter stated in its entirety:
We write to insist that you confirm to us, in writing, no later than noon on
Wednesday, December 21, 2005, that, in light of a superior offer having been
received for the Lancer Corporation ("Lancer" or the "Company") at $23
per share, you are taking no further steps to consummate or in any way facili-
tate the previously announced sale to Hoshizaki America, Inc. ("Hoshizaki")
at $22 per share. Your fiduciary obligations require that you fully and fairly
consider all potential offers and that you disclose to the shareholders all of
your analysis that leads to your recommendation regarding the pending sale
to Hoshizaki or any other offers made.
Id.
134. Id. at 455-56.





the supreme court acknowledged the potential for abuse by lawyers if
demands were allowed to be sent without identifying the complaining
shareholders. 1 3 8 Ultimately, the supreme court held that for all the rea-
sons stated above and because stating a shareholder's name in a demand
costs nothing and does not cause delay, the "demand required by the arti-
cle must name the shareholder on whose behalf it is made." 139
The supreme court was less specific on what "with particularity"
means. It declined to provide a laundry list of required elements that
might satisfy the "particularity" requirement, noting instead that whether
or not a demand is adequate "will depend on the circumstances of the
corporation, the board, and the transaction involved in the complaint." 140
Other than a $1 share price difference, the demand in this case did not
give a reason why one offer was inferior to the other. The supreme court
acknowledged, however, that "[a] large number of variables affect the
inherent value" of stock and "one cannot say whether a $23 offer [is]
superior to [a] $22 offer without knowing a lot more." 141 The supreme
court also noted that the demand in question did not suggest how the
board of directors had failed to consider other offers or what information
the board might have withheld.142
The Schmitz case changes the landscape of derivative actions in at least
two ways. First, plaintiffs will no longer be permitted to file lawsuits after
providing vague and ambiguous demand letters failing to identify the
complaining shareholders. Consequently, defendants will be able to test
the standing of the complaining shareholder more quickly. Second, if
there was any question before, the supreme court has made clear that in
Texas "a shareholder can no longer avoid a demand by proving it would
have been futile."143
The Houston First Court of Appeals addressed standing and the scope
of fiduciary duties owed by officers and directors in the context of a
merger in Somers v. Crane.144 Although the procedural history in the
case is relatively complicated, the two issues of the greatest interest are
simple. The first concerned breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by a
class against directors and officers in the context of a cash-out merger
where the corporation would no longer exist in its pre-merger form and
the shareholders would be dispossessed of any interest in the corporation
after the merger. The class alleged that the directors of the corporation
owed a fiduciary duty directly to the shareholders of the corporation in
this scenario. The court of appeals noted that this duty does not run to
138. The supreme court specifically referred to "a California law firm whose principal
prosecuted hundreds of stockholder derivative actions, and later pleaded guilty to paying
kickbacks to shareholders recruited for that purpose." Id. (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 457.
140. Id. at 458.
141. Id. at 457.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 455.
144. 295 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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shareholders, including majority shareholders. Unless there is a contract
or confidential relationship between the directors and shareholders, the
duty runs only to the corporation.145 The court of appeals rejected the
argument that a special relationship between the directors and sharehold-
ers was created in the context of a cash-out merger, noting specifically
that "fiduciary relationships are of an 'extraordinary nature' and should
not be recognized lightly." 146 Consequently, the court of appeals de-
clined to recognize a fiduciary relationship between a director and a
shareholder in this context.147
The court of appeals also considered an individual shareholder's stand-
ing to sue derivatively on the corporation's behalf when the shareholder
may have had standing prior to the cash-out merger, but lost it as a result
of the merger. Specifically at issue in this case was whether a shareholder
is required to own stock both at the time of filing the derivative suit and
continuously through the completion of the suit to maintain derivative
standing. The court of appeals analyzed the only other Texas case to
squarely address this issue under article 5.14(B), Zauber v. Murray Sav-
ings Association.148 In that case, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a
shareholder is required not only to own stock at the time of the wrongful
transaction but also to maintain that status throughout the lawsuit.149
The Somers court rejected the plaintiff's argument that legislative amend-
ments to article 5.14(B) in 2003 somehow changed its continuous owner-
ship requirement after Zauber.50
The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiff's creative interpretation
of article 5.03(M) of the Texas Business Corporation Act, which states
that "[t]o the extent a shareholder of a corporation has standing to insti-
tute or maintain derivative litigation on behalf of the corporation imme-
diately before a merger, nothing in this article may be construed to limit
or extinguish the shareholder's standing."' 5 ' The court of appeals distin-
guished the effect of a cash-out merger from a merger where the share-
holder receives stock in the newly-created corporation. The court of
appeals agreed that when the shareholder receives stock the stockholder
"might continuously maintain an economic interest in the derivative re-
covery."152 In a cash-out merger, however, the shareholder is left with no
ownership interest, which defeats standing.' 53
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id. at 12.
147. Id.
148. 591 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ ref'd, 601 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.
1980) (per curiam).
149. Id. at 937.
150. Somers v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5, 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied).





B. COURTS OF APPEALS TACKLE CAPACITY AND SERVICE
During this Survey period, both the Austin and Dallas Courts of Ap-
peals addressed the significance of how an officer signs corporate docu-
ments. Although the issues were different in both cases, the rulings
indicate that unless an officer indicates he is signing specifically in his
individual capacity, courts will not bind the officer individually. In Inves-
tIN.com Corp. v. Europa International Ltd., the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that a president of a corporation was neither personally, nor jointly
and severally, liable for payments to be made by the corporation pursu-
ant to a settlement agreement that the president signed individually when
the president did not agree to make payments personally. 154 In that case,
a corporation and its president were sued for breach of three contracts,
none of which the president had signed. Although the president was not
personally liable for any of the contracts, he did not raise capacity as a
defense in the underlying lawsuit concerning those contracts. When the
parties reached a settlement agreement, the president signed the settle-
ment agreement individually and on behalf of the corporation. Signifi-
cantly, however, all of the payment terms in the settlement agreement
specifically identified the corporation as the party responsible for making
payments. Although the release language in the settlement agreement
identified consideration, including payments, releases, and representa-
tions, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's theory that the president
promised payments as consideration for his release155 Ultimately, the
court of appeals held that the president was not personally liable for pay-
ments under the settlement agreement, because he was not a party to or
responsible for the obligations in the underlying contracts, there was no
specific language in the settlement agreement indicating personal liabil-
ity, and the president did not make any promises individually to make
payments pursuant to the settlement agreement.156
Similarly, the Austin Court of Appeals in First ATM, Inc. v. Onedoz,
Inc.157 found that the president of a corporation did not personally guar-
antee a contract despite the existence of the term "individual guarantor"
in the contract because there was no evidence that the president executed
the contract in his individual capacity. The underlying issue in First ATM
concerned whether or not the court could exercise personal jurisdiction
over an officer of the corporation, but jurisdiction hinged on whether the
president of the corporation had entered into a contract in his individual
capacity. The president's name, not the corporation's (Onedoz, Inc.'s)
name, was printed on the merchant name line. The contract also defined
the contracting merchant as "the entity receiving goods and services from
154. 293 S.W.3d 819, 828-29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
155. Id. at 828.
156. Id. at 827-28.




FATM, as both institution and as individual guarantor."158 The plaintiff,
First ATM, conceded that Onedoz was the principal obligor of the con-
tract and that the corporation, not the president, was the entity receiving
goods and services. FATM relied on the definition of merchant to sup-
port its position that the president was the individual guarantor. How-
ever, because Onedoz was the only entity receiving goods and services,
the court of appeals found that, if anything, the language at issue identi-
fied Onedoz as the "individual guarantor."159 FATM also argued that a
sentence within the insurance provision of the contract stating that "the
individual executing this Agreement shall be personally liable for all
amounts due to FATM under this agreement" made the president a guar-
antor, but the court of appeals rejected this argument because there was
no evidence that the president executed the contract in his individual ca-
pacity.160 Because the signature on the contract did not specifically iden-
tify that the president was signing in his individual capacity, the assent
that the "'individual executing the contract is personally liable' was made
solely in his representative capacity," and the president "never agreed in
his individual capacity to be bound by any provision in the contract."1 61
Consequently, the president did not execute the contract in his individual
capacity, and jurisdiction was not proper.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals addressed how to compel a non-party
director deposition in In re Reaud.162 In that case, Huntsman Corpora-
tion brought suit against a bank, alleging interference with a merger. The
bank attempted to serve a notice of deposition on one of the corpora-
tion's outside directors by mailing it to the corporation's counsel. The
bank failed to provide a subpoena to the individual director. After the
corporation's counsel advised the bank that the director was not subject
to its control, the bank filed a motion to compel the deposition. The bank
argued that the corporation controlled the director because it compen-
sated the director with cash, stock, stock options, and bonuses for serving
as a director. Additionally, the bank essentially asserted waiver, arguing
that the corporation had voluntarily provided depositions of other direc-
tors in the same case. The trial court denied the director's request for a
protective order and ordered the deposition, simply stating with no analy-
sis: "He's a director."163 The director filed a writ of mandamus, and the
court of appeals reversed, finding that the corporation did not maintain
control over the director.164 First, the court of appeals noted that, by
law, the directors manage the corporation, not vice versa.165 Addition-
ally, the court of appeals looked at Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 199.3




162. 286 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, no pet. h.).
163. Id. at 578.
164. Id. at 583.
165. Id. at 579.
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and 205.1 to assess which non-parties may be required to attend deposi-
tions without being subpoenaed. Those non-parties include employees,
retained experts, and those individuals who are "otherwise subject to the
control of the party."166 The court of appeals noted that corporations
have the power to terminate the relationship of both an employee and a
retained expert and therefore, applying noscitur a sociis ("a word is
known by the company it keeps"), a corporation is required to exercise
the same type of control over the third class of non-parties as it does over
employees and retained experts.167 The court noted that if the corpora-
tion's bylaws or articles of incorporation included a provision that al-
lowed for termination or removal from certain committees for a
director's failure to comply with a deposition notice, the corporation
could be found to exercise the control contemplated by the rules.168 No
articles or bylaws were in the record, however, and therefore there was
no evidence that the director was subject to termination, demotion, or a
reduction in his fees as a director based upon his refusal to attend the
deposition.
C. TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONTINUES To REFINE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECTOR AND OFFICER INSURANCE
COVERAGE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed a second director and officer case
during this Survey period-this one on the notice requirements in direc-
tor and officer insurance policies.169 In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court
changed the rules with regard to notice requirements, holding that "an
insured's failure to timely notify its insurer of a claim or suit does not
defeat coverage if the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay."o70 PAl,
Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co.171 involved an occurrence-based commer-
cial general liability policy with a prompt-notice provision that required
the insured to notify the insurer of an occurrence as soon as practical.
This year, the Texas Supreme Court examined a claims-made policy in the
Prodigy case. Prodigy Communications merged with Flashnet Communi-
cations in 2000. Flashnet was named in a suit as a defendant in Novem-
ber 2001, and Prodigy was served with a copy of the complaint in June
2002. A settlement was reached in 2003, and Prodigy, allegedly believing
the insurance company, AESIC, already had notice of the suit, notified
the insurance company in June 2003 that a settlement had been reached,
and requested consent to the proposed settlement agreement. The insur-
ance company immediately denied coverage on the ground that the June
166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.3.
167. In re Reaud, 286 S.W.3d at 579-80.
168. Id. at 580.
169. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess and Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d 374
(Tex. 2009).
170. Id. at 375 (quoting PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex.
2008)).
171. 243 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2008).
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2003 letter did not comply with the policy's notice requirements. The pol-
icy was a claims-made policy requiring that the insured, as a condition
precedent, give notice of a claim as soon as practicable, but in no event
later than ninety days after the expiration of the policy period.172 AESIC
moved for summary judgment arguing that Prodigy had failed to meet the
policy's condition precedent that notice of a claim be given as soon as
practicable.
Although the parties disputed whether notice of the claim had been
given as soon as practicable, they agreed that the claim had been made
within the ninety-day cutoff period. The trial court granted AESIC's mo-
tion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that (1) Prodigy was required to give notice as soon as practical notwith-
standing the ninety-day period, (2) notice was given almost one year after
the filing of the lawsuit against Prodigy, which was not "as soon as practi-
cal" as a matter of law, and (3) the insurance company was not required
to show that it was prejudiced by Prodigy's late notice. 7 3
The Texas Supreme Court framed the issue as
whether, under a claims-made policy, an insurer can deny coverage
based on its insured's alleged failure to comply with a policy provi-
sion requiring that notice of a claim be given "as soon as practica-
ble," when (1) notice of the claim was provided before the reporting
deadline specified in the policy and (2) the insurer was not
prejudiced by the delay.174
Noting that whether or not notice as a condition precedent was not the
sole issue, the supreme court analyzed in detail the difference between a
claims-made policy and an occurrence policy. Ultimately, the supreme
court found that the main difference between the two types of policies is
that a claims-made policy provides "unlimited retroactive coverage and
no prospective coverage, while an 'occurrence' policy provides unlimited
prospective coverage and no retroactive coverage."175 The supreme
court noted that a claims-made policy requiring notice as soon as practi-
cable "serves to maximize the insurer's opportunity to . . . set reserves
and control or participate in negotiations," whereas the requirement that
the claim be made during a certain period within the policy period pro-
vides "temporal boundaries of the policy's basic coverage." 176 In other
words, it defines the limits of the insurer's obligation. Ultimately, the
supreme court held that if notice is made outside the policy's specified
timeframe, an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice to deny cover-
age.177 However, "when an insured gives notice within the policy period
or other specified reporting period, the insurer must show that the in-
sured's noncompliance with the policy's 'as soon as practicable' notice
172. Prodigy Commc'ns Corp., 288 S.W.3d at 376.
173. Id. at 377.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 379.
176. Id. at 380.
177. Id. at 381-82.
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provision prejudiced the insurer before it may deny coverage."178 Be-
cause AESIC conceded it was not prejudiced by the delayed notice and
notice was within the reporting deadline specified by the policy, summary
judgment was not proper.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether discussing Jimmy Buffett, clarifying privity and damages is-
sues in malpractice cases, acknowledging unsettled law concerning medi-
cal expert reports, or addressing notice requirements for director and
officer insurance coverage, the Texas Supreme Court was active in cases
concerning professional liability. It remains to be seen whether the large
number of supreme court opinions and the diverse topics covered by the
appellate courts reflect an upward trend in the number of professional
liability cases filed, or merely an increased interest in the outcome of
these cases by the Texas courts. What is certain, however, is that it con-
tinues to be important for the professional liability lawyer to stay on top
of the changing legal landscape.
178. Id. at 382.
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